I agree with Carmen that extended conversations on such complex
topics as discrimination is rarely constructive.
However, I would like to point out a few gaps in the thread that may
be of interest.
Firstly, it is I think important to maintain a distinction between
the broad, cognitive aspect of discrimination, which is ethically
neutral (for example our ability to discriminate between a range of
stimuli such as colours, smells and sounds) through to our ability
to discriminate on moral grounds, such as whether an individual may
be responsible for anti-social behavior on grounds of intention or
by accident.
We make many such discriminating judgments everyday, including
making a
distinction between groups of people, for example if they represent
a threat or a friendship group.
So, it seems naive to suggest that all discrimination is
reprehensible or sub-optimal in these conditions.
Identifying disadvantage I believe is something that is also
critical to feeling empathy, since we would be unable to respond to
a wounded animal for example if we were not able to tell the
difference between an injured creature and a creature that just
happens to have motility functions we do not have, such as a fish
that uses a tail to propel itself efficiently through water.
Treating animals and people differently then seems to be an
indicator of high level sentient functioning, since it prefigures
nurturing, appropriate threat responses, efficient networking and
much else besides I would imagine.
Now that is out of the way we can turn our attention to the
pejorative sense of the word discrimination, which is almost always
synonymous with violence, disparity and harms of one sort or another
that can be avoided if (as Carmen says) they could be avoided in
some way.
The suggestion that the broad, general meaning of discrimination as
cognitive predisposition is as 'wrong' as the narrow meaning of
harming another creature or human being based on self-centered
prejudice masks the two different meanings and so the phrase 'Two
wrongs don't make a right' isn't a helpful metaphor here.
To use Orwell again: 'discrimination means that we ignore the
fact that we live in a world where not all people have the
same opportunities and that people of certain gender or
color are privileged' is not meant to define discrimination
only in gender or racial terms.
Orwell here is providing two exemplary cases, race and gender as
being among the most ubiquitous traits where people are making
distinctions that don't relate to the issue at hand (eg. a persons
ability to write quality software) which we know depends on other
things such as using a good quality copyleft license ;-))
Also, finding exceptions to the general rule that white, male
interests are generally over represented in all the most influential
and powerful places around the world does not destroy Orwell's point
which is pointing out that these named power asymmetries are so
common, collectivist discrimination would seem to deliver an outcome
where more disadvantaged people (howsoever this is assessed) would
undeniably solve the problem of lack of representation of
disadvantage people so again, this is not at all contradictory but a
direct intervention to solve an identified problem of lack of
representation in whatever group or organization we are assessing.
Finally, we come to what i think is the main problem, which is how
do we identify the (so called) 'disadvantaged' or 'minority'
interests?
This is where Carmen's view is important, because to suggest a
person of colour or a woman is disadvantaged to an extent that they
ought to be given special privileges over white men in every job
interview is not where we want to be.
I agree also that the concept of equality is just as much a means as
it is an end, so how we get to a state of equality has to be equal
also if only to avoid the critical self-defeat as Carmen is keen to
point out.
Where people tend to disagree is largely contingent on many factors
which means it's rarely possible to be 'wholly against this type of
discrimination' without taking into account the circumstances in
each case, for example what the aims or goals of a particular policy
are trying to achieve.
I would take issue with the view that the
LGBT community approached their struggle for
equality with judicious deployment of characters/people in popular
media. I think a lot of LGBT rights activists would argue that their
cause has been hard won, with many set backs and not least with
unrecognized work from lawyers, business people, educators and
professionals doing what they can to make the lives of LGBT folk
better.
All of this of course necessitated active discrimination since
playwrights, TV producers, directors, financers, lawyers and many
others would have deliberately written such characters into their
movies, advertisements and so forth to give the LGBT community a
voice where there was previously only bigotry and ignorance.
I would also take issue that low privilege is inherent to low
income.
Means testing for income doesn't for example highlight the cases
where people have very little income but have vast personal assets
that are simply accruing capital, such as in offshore centres, in
some property portfolios and in startups to name only a few.
In terms of the idea that the redistribution of wealth is the best
way to approach equality doesn't deal with the socially situated
problems of institutional corruption in government, politics and
business; logistical problems (problems with access to technology,
employment, goods etc.) wherever national infrastructure relies on
provisioning by profit-seeking, exploitative corporations; and
uneven levels of numeracy and literacy both geographically and
socio-economically - all of these are of course would still be
prevalent in a so-called, 'progressive', egalitarian society based
on a fairer redistribution of wealth, since our capacity for wasting
public money is of course legendary.
It would be especially problematic to accept uncritically the idea
that positive discrimination somehow engenders low expectations.
This narrative is especially worrying since it tends to demonize
beneficiaries of such schemes as somehow being unworthy of benefits,
which I eschew on the grounds that such a view is divisive,
controversial and tends to privilege the already privileged, by
which I mean those that do not feel they need any support from such
institutional incentives for whatever reason.
/ mat