On Sunday 29 February 2004 02:40, Niall Douglas wrote:
I think we need to acknowledge that by far the most important and most easily justifiable requirement is the verifiable paper audit.
My concern is that any additional demands (such as opening the sourcecode) which IMHO is justifiable, but far less justifiable than the paper trail, may detract from our ability to achieve the primary goal.
Personally I can't see much use for a paper trail if the source is fully open. However since it's unlikely the source would be made open (breach of contract or an expensive renegotiation), a paper trail is better than nothing.
The problem is that you don't know that the source code you saw is actually running on the machine and now matter how much you study it, you'll never really know that it's actually 100% bug free.
Open source is desirable but an independent paper audit trail, verified by each voter before it drops into the box is the only thing that can give an acceptable level of security and confidence.
http://lists.stdlib.net/mailman/listinfo/e-voting
is the place for an extended debate,
F